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1. Summary 
 
The Government of Georgia (GoG) is currently preparing a new Local Self Government Code that will 
introduce significant modifications to the structure of local-self-governments (LSGs) in Georgia. 
Currently, Georgia has 63 LSGs (excluding Tbilisi and those areas not under Georgian control). If the 
proposed law is approved in Parliament, it would increase the number of LSG units dramatically: 
according to the GoG, by 2015 there would be close to 120 LSGs, and by 2018, approximately 240 LSGs 
overall.   At time of writing, the draft Code was still under discussion by the GoG, prior to its introduction 
to Parliament. 
 
This policy proposal has generated considerable debate, particularly with respect to its eventual costs. 
Thus, as a contribution to the policy reform process prior to its finalization and introduction to the 
Parliament, in August 2013 the G3 program contracted the International School of Economics at Tbilisi 
State University (ISET) to carry out a study of the fiscal implications of the GoG’s proposal to increase the 
number of municipalities.1  In designing the study, G3 consulted with the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
which agreed to provide ISET with all of the necessary fiscal data on LSG revenues and expenditures.  
The ISET researchers, too, conferred with the MoF on the data sources and also with representatives of 
the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure (MRDI) on the scope and timing of the 
proposed territorial reform. 
 
The proposed reform is motivated by the so-called Subsidiarity Principle, calling for a maximal 
decentralization of governmental administration, as local governments are arguably better informed 
about local circumstances and can therefore make decisions that better fit local preferences and needs. 
The advantages of subsidiarity are not necessarily monetary, but may, for example, come in the form of 
higher legitimacy of government decisions. At the same time, according to the theory of fiscal 
federalism, an LSG should only execute those government functions that are primarily of local relevance, 
as the decentralized management of tasks that span larger regions typically gives rise to inefficiencies. 
For instance, so-called spillover effects lead to an undersupply of governmental services, as some local 
governments can have a free-ride on the public services that are provided by their neighboring 
municipalities. 
                                                          
1
 Other aspects of the GoG’s proposed reform, like the establishment of regional unions of LSGs, village councils, 
and the changes in LSG competencies and responsibilities, are not taken into account in this study. 
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In response to concerns about the increase in the costs, in the draft Code circulated by MRDI, there are 
provisions to limit the number of LSG employees. According to MRDI, at the end of 2012 there were 
approximately 13,000 direct employees of the LSGs. The reform includes a formula-based limit on the 
maximum number of direct LSG employees in each municipality. Indeed, the proposed formula would 
result in limiting the total number of employees in 240 LSGs to 13,000 (i.e. redistributing the existing 
positions). 
 
In this study, we estimate what the annual additional cost will be of dividing the existing set of 62 LSGs 
(without Tbilisi or Batumi) to create either 124 or 248 LSGs in total (i.e., dividing the existing LSGs by two 
or by four on average).2 Comparative research on local self-governments, which is cited in this study, 
consistently shows that dividing LSGs into smaller units can increase the overall operating costs, owing 
to a large component of fixed costs in service provision, i.e., the costs associated with having an 
“installed capacity” to provide services. Often the fixed costs will outweigh possible savings through 
decreasing returns to scale in the provision of public services, which are observed in many countries. In 
addition, the analysis looks at the impact of the GoG’s proposed measure to limit the number of 
employees in each LSG.   
  
We find that Georgia is similar to other countries in these respects: increasing the total number of LSGs 
will incur some savings in the variable costs, but these savings are outweighed by the increased fixed 
costs. Thus, the research results presented here show that in Georgia, there is a clear policy trade-off 
between having smaller LSGs, which would be closer to voters and service users, and the higher overall 
costs of a larger number of LSGs. Specifically, we show that total costs of LSG service production in 
Georgia are made up of a fixed cost component, and a variable cost component that grows 
exponentially in the number of citizens served; that also grows exponentially in the geographical 
extension (measured in square kilometers); that grows linearly according to the population density. The 
parameters of the relationship between the LSG costs and these three variables are estimated 
econometrically.  
 
                                                          
2
 The econometric analysis is based on expenditure data of 62 Georgian municipalities for the years 2010-12 and 
characteristic data (population, area, etc.). Batumi, due to its outstandingly high budget, is excluded from the 
analysis as a statistical outlier.   
Biermann et al./LSG Reform  5 
 
We apply our methodology to four different policy scenarios, which reflect the ongoing discussions 
about the reform proposal, i.e., the number of new LSGs that will be created (a total of about 120 LSGs 
or about 240 LSGs); and the possibility of putting limits on the number of LSG employees.3 
 
 In Scenario 1, we divide each of the existing 62 LSGs by 4 to create 248 LSGs overall. We assume 
that there are no restrictions on LSG personnel expenditures. The country-wide increase in the 
yearly running costs would then be about 709 million lari.  
 
 In Scenario 2, we again divide each of the existing 62 LSGs by 4 to create 248 LSGs overall, but 
we assume that the total number of direct LSG employees would remain constant. In this case, 
we estimate the country-wide increase of the annual running costs to be about 384 million lari. 
 
 In Scenario 3, we divide each of the existing 63 LSGs into 2 to create only 126 LSGs overall, while 
we assume no restrictions on the personnel costs. The result is an estimated country-wide cost 
increase of about 169 million lari.  
 
 Finally, Scenario 4 assumes a division of each of the existing LSGs by 2 and again a restriction of 
personnel costs. This leads to a country-wide cost increase of about 67 million lari. 
 
2. The LSG reform 
 
Currently, there are 65 local self-governments (LSGs) in Georgia.  A policy reform proposal that has been 
developed by the Ministry of Regional Development (1), if approved by the Parliament, will possibly 
increase the number of LSGs to a number close to 240 (5). The exact number of new LSGs to be created 
is not stated in the draft LSG Code, which only provides guidelines for restructuring.4 The primary 
criteria for the formation of LSGs are population density and the number of inhabitants (see (1), Article 
22).  If the population density of a region is up to 10 people per square kilometer, the LSG will require at 
least 2000 inhabitants. If the density is 10-30 people per km, then the LSG is required to have at least 
                                                          
3
 These estimations do not include “transitional” costs for new buildings, equipment, training of new LSG 
employees, etc., nor do they include cost of additional functions that may be assigned to LSGs under the reform. 
 
4
 We refer to the English translation of the draft law of June 2013. Since June, a newer version of the draft law was 
circulated, but it looks as if the aspects that are central to our study, i.e., the number of LSGs to be established 
through territorial reform, were not changed. 
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5000 inhabitants, and so on. The entire rule for forming new LSGs according to density is summarized in 
Table 1.5  
 
Table 1. The population density rule for forming new LSGs. 
Density (people per km2) Number of inhabitants must be 
<10 ≥ 2.000 
10-30 ≥ 5.000 
30-50 ≥ 10.000 
> 50 ≥ 15.000 
 
The draft LSG Code also sets upper limits for the number of civil servants that can be employed by the 
newly formed LSGs ((1), Article 55, Clause 3). These limits depend on the number of voters (citizens aged 
18 and older) living in the LSG.  However, in the most recent version of the draft Code, the rule as stated 
in (1) was modified. Instead of capping the number of employees, it proposes to restrict the number of 
LSG employees through the following formula: 
 
          
 
   
      (2.1) 
where N is the maximal number of employees of the LSG and v is the number of registered voters living 
in the LSG. 
 
3. Assumptions underlying the Cost Estimate 
 
The goal of our study is to estimate the implications of the proposed reform for the overall cost of 
providing public services at the LSG level. The specific question we want to answer is: What will be the 
total annual running costs of the LSGs after the reform is implemented if public services are provided at 
the average level of the years 2010-2012?  To respond to this question, we have to make certain 
assumptions:  
                                                          
5
 There can be exceptions to the rule if its strict application would lead to remote settlements being far from the 
administrative center of the municipality. In such cases it is possible to form LSGs that have fewer than 2000 
inhabitants (see (1), Article 22, Clause 3). 
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Revenue changes 
Regardless of any impact the reform has on tax revenues, all public services must be paid by the people 
of Georgia in one way or another. The impact on tax revenues has technical importance for the state 
budget, but from an economics perspective they are largely irrelevant. With regard to the economic 
impact, the central question is whether LSG public services can be provided in the new situation more or 
less efficiently than previously. Therefore we restrict the analysis to the expenditure side of the LSG 
budgets. 
 
Immaterial benefits 
The classical view in the literature on fiscal federalism is that the local level of government should 
execute only those government functions that are primarily of local relevance, because the 
decentralized management of tasks that span over larger regions typically gives rise to inefficiencies.6 
There are ample examples of inefficiencies resulting from too much decentralization. For instance, so-
called spillover effects lead to an undersupply of services by LSGs if these services have a regional 
impact, as local governments can have a free-ride on the efforts made by the neighboring municipalities 
(see (11)). 
 
In contrast, the Subsidiarity Principle calls for the decentralization of government. This is primarily based 
on the assumption that local governments are better informed about local circumstances. The 
advantages of subsidiarity are not necessarily monetary and may also be immaterial. For example, policy 
decisions may be perceived to be more legitimate if they are made locally, which may, in turn, affect the 
acceptance of a decision within the local population (cf. (3), Chapter 1). Obviously, the Subsidiarity 
Principle should only be applied as long as the advantages of decentralized governance outweigh the 
resulting inefficiencies. This rule does not, however, lead to a level of decentralization that everybody 
agrees on, as the non-monetary benefits from subsidiarity are hardly quantifiable and remain 
controversial (cf. (3), Chapter 1). 
 
We restrict ourselves to estimating the cost of running LSGs after the implementation of the reform, and 
ignore any possible non-monetary advantages that might result. This study will provide an estimate of 
                                                          
6 This opinion was already expressed in the 18th century by the American Founding Father Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) 
(see (14), Chapters 1 and 11). 
 
Biermann et al./LSG Reform  8 
 
what the price of subsidiarity is, while political decision makers must determine how much they are 
willing to pay for it. 
 
Level of services 
After the reform is implemented, the level of public services provided to the people of Georgia by LSGs 
may not be the same as it is now. This is obviously cost-relevant, as a reduction of services can easily 
lead to cost reduction. For a valid comparison it is thus necessary to make the assumption that the level 
of services remains the same. Only under this assumption can the fiscal impact of the reform be 
determined. 
 
Transition costs 
In addition to changes in the costs of providing public services, it can be expected that there will be 
certain one-time costs that accrue due to the transition from the old to the new system. Estimating 
these transition costs would call for a largely different methodology than that used for the estimation of 
the running costs. In this study, therefore, we will restrict ourselves to the running costs. One should 
also bear in mind that, as a result of neglecting the transition costs, the true total cost of the proposed 
reform may be higher. 
 
Regional unions 
In our cost estimation, we will assume that the new institution of the “regional LSG unions” will not take 
over either those tasks prescribed in (1), Article 73, Clause 2, or any tasks delegated by the LSGs 
according to (1), Article 74, Clause 2. As it was pointed out in (5), the subsidiarity gains from the reform 
will be lower the more functions are withheld from the LSGs and kept at the higher level of government 
layer. From the point of view of the efficiency/subsidiarity trade-off, the tasks that remain on the 
regional union level can be considered “neutral”. 
 
Caps on the number of employees 
Regarding the caps on the number of employees, we will look at two scenarios. In what we term the 
“optimistic scenario”, the rule as given by Formula (2.1) takes effect. In that case, the total number of 
direct employees of the LSGs would remain approximately the same as it is now (about 13,000), and it is 
assumed that this number of employees is sufficient to provide the same level of public services on 
average as in the years 2010-2012. This implies that there is considerable potential for productivity gains 
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that can and will be realized.  In the “pessimistic scenario”, we assume that the cap will not be effective 
or not be part of the reform. 
 
4. Estimating the Costs of Providing Public Services 
4.1. The Cost Function 
 
A cost function gives the cost of a production process as a function of relevant variables (see (12), p. 
25).7 These variables are primarily the amounts of the produced outputs, but other factors that have an 
influence on production costs – like input prices – may also be arguments of the function (see (7), p. 15). 
Every production process that can be described by a production function, i.e. a function that describes 
the levels of (possibly multiple) outputs as a function of the amounts of inputs used, has a cost function. 
This is due to the so-called “duality” between cost and production, allowing a cost function to be 
derived from any well-specified production function (see (7), Chapter 9; (12), p. 45).  
 
Also the production of public services is a production process that can be described by a production 
function and hence by a cost function. The outputs of the production process may be approximated by 
(amongst many other things): 
 
 the number of citizens served in a public office, 
 the total length of the roads that are maintained, 
 the number of children to whom preschooling is provided, 
 the amount of people protected by fire brigades. 
 
When the production process is for services, not goods, then the amounts of outputs are usually 
measured relative to a certain time span. So one would consider the “number of citizens served in a 
public office over a year” and “the total length of roads that are maintained within a year” and so on. 
The inputs of such a production process can be approximated by (amongst many other things): 
 
 
                                                          
7 Formally, a cost function with n cost-relevant variables is a function C : R × R × . . . × R → R. 
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 the number of employees working for the public entity providing the services, 
 the endowment with electronic equipment, 
 the number of buildings available (adjusted by size and quality), 
 the availability of cars and special machinery (e.g. construction vehicles and fire trucks). 
 
The representation of a production process by a production function and the derivation of the 
associated cost function is by no means restricted to private enterprises or industrial production 
processes. On the contrary, there is an extensive body of literature applying this approach to services 
(see (10)) and to public entities (e.g. hospitals (15), public education (13), and public theatres (16)). 
 
4.2. Choosing the Functional Form 
 
Many different functional forms for production functions can be found in the literature, like the Cobb-
Douglas production function (see (7), pp. 326-33), the Leontief production function (see (7), pp. 333-
342), and the Gutenberg production function (see (7), pp. 342-354). The production functions are closely 
connected to the associated cost functions, and many properties of a particular production function 
carry over to the cost function. For example, the cost function associated with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function is itself a Cobb-Douglas function. 
 
Most common in empirical estimates of cost functions is the assumption that the underlying production 
process is of a Cobb-Douglas type (see (2), Chapter 3; (8)). 
 
If       are the cost-relevant variables, then this functional form is given by 
 (       )     
       
   
where the parameters        are assumed to be from the interval [0,1]. 
 
This function has many appealing mathematical properties. For example, the value of the sum of 
exponents (the expression ∑        ) immediately reveals whether the production process has 
constant, increasing, or decreasing returns to scale. 
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It is a frequently expressed criticism, however, that in many instances the Cobb-Douglas functional form 
is chosen primarily because of its mathematical convenience, not because it fits the underlying 
economic process particularly well (see, for example, (4)).  
 
For the purpose of estimating the cost function of Georgian LSGs, the Cobb-Douglas form has the 
decisive disadvantage that there are no fixed production costs. Fixed production costs are those costs 
that accrue just from providing the capacity to produce something, even if no actual production takes 
place (see (7), p. 15). Even if an LSG were formed in a region without inhabitants, roads, and any other 
cost-relevant factors, just the sustenance of the entity will cause some costs. As we do not want to 
exclude fixed costs in our estimation by choosing a functional form that would – regardless of the data 
used for estimation – lead to fixed costs of zero, we have decided against the Cobb-Douglas form. 
Instead, we will estimate a polynomial functional form of the type 
     (       )                    (4.1) 
where       are derived from data on cost-relevant factors, and           are parameters of the 
function. In the econometric estimation, we will estimate values for   and for        . 
 
In the optimistic scenario, when we assume that the number of employees will remain the same, the left 
hand-side of (4.1) will only include those costs that are not directly associated with employees (like 
salaries). So essentially, in this case we are estimating the cost function of only the non-personnel costs 
of the LSGs. In the pessimistic scenario, the left hand-side of (4.1) will incorporate the total costs of 
providing public services on the LSG level, including the costs for employees.  
 
The functional form (4.1) is very flexible. By choosing a polynomial function, we do not dictate through 
the functional form that there will be a positive fixed cost: in the estimation it is not ruled out that 
   . Moreover, the    may be the squared or even the cubic values of data, so that we can take into 
account possible non-linearities. 
 
In fact, the polynomial functional form can mimic a Cobb-Douglas function. By the Theorem of Taylor, 
every function which can be differentiated arbitrarily often (as it is the case for the Cobb-Douglas 
function) can be arbitrarily closely approximated by a polynomial function ((6), p. 10). 
The parameters of the function (4.1) will be estimated with an econometric regression. We are not 
going to describe the mathematical details of that method – (2) provides a comprehensive introduction 
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to regression techniques. The general idea is that we estimate values for   and for         based on 
the given data for the 62 current LSGs. 
 
For a valid regression, it has to be tested which set of variables       has the highest explanatory 
power for the total costs of an average LSG. Moreover, there are various different estimation methods, 
like the standard Ordinary Least Square, the more sophisticated Generalized Least Square, Maximum 
Likelihood, Fixed Effect estimations and Random Effect estimations, and many others.  
 
Statistical indicators reveal the quality of the particular configuration chosen in a regression. Such 
indicators are the famous R2 and various tests for misspecifications of the model. Essentially, the optimal 
specification and the best estimation technique have to be determined through trial and error. How we 
got to our specific functional form will be described in more detail in Section 7.1. Section 6 describes the 
data on which we will base the regression. 
 
5. The Costs of Providing Public Services after the LSG reform is Implemented 
 
Once we have estimated values for the parameters   and         in the equation (4.1), we can use this 
information for estimating the cost of providing public services (at the current level) as a function of the 
number of LSGs. The value of   has special relevance for this, because it corresponds to the fixed 
production cost, i.e. the cost that needs to be paid just in order to provide the capacity to deliver public 
services. 
 
If a new LSG were to be established, then the value of   needs to be paid per year even if the 
explanatory variables on the right hand-side of (4.1) would all be 0. Even if an LSG were to have no land, 
no population etc.,   would still have to be paid. 
 
The variable production costs, which enter the total cost with the coefficients 
        
could be neglected for the total cost estimation if they entered linearly (because the total number of 
people, land etc. does not change through the reform). If there will be non-linearities, as it turns out to 
be the case in our estimation, ignoring the variable cost would create a bias. Therefore they need to be 
taken into account as well. 
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6. The Data 
 
The analysis is based on a database that contains budgetary, demographic, and geographic information 
on 63 Georgian municipalities for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012.8 The budgetary data of each 
municipality are structured both according to functional9 and line item categories, and all entries are 
adjusted by the GDP deflator and expressed in 2012 prices. As far as non-budgetary information is 
concerned, the database contains per year figures for each LSG on the characteristics provided in Table 
2 below. 
 
Table 2: Non-budgetary characteristics of the LSGs 
Characteristic: 
Population 
Area 
Population below poverty line 
                Population of age 0-6 
Population of age 6-18 
Total length of roads 
Population living in urban areas 
 
6.1. Scenarios 
 
The analysis features two different scenarios, a pessimistic and an optimistic one. In the pessimistic 
scenario, it is assumed that there will be no cap on the number of employees, either because the 
capping rule cannot be enforced, or because it is dismissed in the upcoming parliamentary process. In 
this case, personnel expenditures are treated in the same way as any other expenditures of the LSGs, i.e. 
they are assumed to depend on explanatory variables like population and area in the same way as other 
costs. 
                                                          
8
 Tbilisi and those regions that are currently not under Georgian control were excluded. 
9 Functional categories are also called programmatic categories. 
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In the optimistic scenario, it is assumed that the total cost for directly employed staff will not be 
affected by the reform, and the sum of salaries and other expenditures associated with employees will 
remain constant. 
 
Table 3 shows how much of the average total expenditures is comprised by personnel costs. The first 
line shows the mean value of the total cost including personnel expenditures. Here, the average cost of 
an LSG in the three years under consideration is 13.788 million lari. If one takes out salaries and other 
costs for employees, this amount goes down to 10.956 million lari (the second line). The Figure also 
indicates the standard deviation of the total costs with and without personnel expenditures. 
 
Table 3: Summary of data including Batumi 
Variable Mean (in million lari) Std. Dev. (in million lari) 
Real total cost 13.788 24.575 
Real total cost without personnel expenditures 10.956 21.708 
Number of observations 189 
 
For obtaining the cost without personnel expenditures, we subtracted from the total cost the complete 
line item “wages and salaries”. Moreover, from the line item “goods and services” we subtracted the 
subcategories “travelling allowances”, “office costs”, “expenses for furniture, uniforms, and personal 
hygiene items”, “maintenance of transport equipment and technology”, and “expenses of other goods 
and services”.  
 
Arguably, not all of these expenditures are solely determined by the number of employees. For example, 
even if the reform does not increase the number of employees, one might expect office costs to 
increase if the same number of employees is now distributed over geographically separated workplaces 
as there would be less synergy. Because we want to estimate the costs of the reform “conservatively”, 
we assume that all of these costs remain constant. 
 
 
6.2. The impact of Batumi 
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The size and the structure of the budget of Batumi is very different from any other LSG in Georgia. Table 
4 shows the 15 Georgian municipalities that had the highest total costs in the year 2012. The two 
columns show the total costs (including personnel expenditures) and the population of the municipality, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4: The 15 LSGs with the largest total cost in 2012 
Municipality Real total cost (in million lari) Population (in thousands) 
Batumi 183 126 
Kutaisi 61 197 
Rustavi 48 123 
Gori 47 146 
Akhaltskikhe 43 49 
Zugdidi 32 178 
Poti 31 48 
Kobuleti 30 93 
Mestia 25 15 
Mtskheta 20 58 
Bolnisi 20 78 
Marneuli 20 130 
Gardabani 20 100 
Chiatura 20 76 
Gurjaani 19 70 
 
Batumi, with a population of 126,000 people, has a budget of 183 million lari. Kutaisi and Zugdidi, with 
populations of 197,000 and 178,000 people, respectively, have budgets of 61 and 32 million lari. So even 
though their populations are larger than Batumi’s, their budgets are just about one-third and one-sixth 
of Batumi’s. Gori has a larger population than Batumi’s, yet its budget size is just one-quarter. Rustavi 
and Marneuli have population numbers close to Batumi, but their expenditures are drastically lower. 
The citizens of Marneuli are served with a budget of only 20 million lari, less than one-ninth of Batumi’s 
expenditures.10 
 
Thus, Batumi is a statistical outlier (see (9), pp. 99-102). It is common practice in econometrics to 
remove such abnormal observations because they are exceptions that do not represent the relationship 
under consideration. If outliers remain in the data, they can heavily influence the result of the analysis 
because of their extreme values. 
 
                                                          
10
 The difference between Batumi and the other LSGs was even more drastic in the years 2010 and 2011. For sake 
of simplicity we have not included these. 
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That this is true for Batumi becomes clear when looking at Batumi’s impact on the average total costs of 
LSGs. In Table 3 above, the average total cost including Batumi was 13,788,450 lari; however, without 
Batumi, Table 5 below shows the average total cost is only 11,108,290 lari. If we look at the “optimistic 
scenarios”, i.e. holding personnel costs constant, the numbers are 10,956,090 lari and 8,613,536 lari, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5: Summary of data without Batumi 
Variable Mean (in million lari) Std. Dev. (in million lari) 
Real total cost 11.108 12.593 
Real total cost without personnel expenditures 8.613 11.456 
Number of observations 186 
 
We will solve this problem by removing Batumi from the data. While this improves the statistical quality 
of the regression, it also makes our estimation of cost implications more conservative, as including 
Batumi forcefully drives up the average cost of providing public services in LSGs (see also Subsection 7.3 
on page 22). 
 
7. Regressions 
 
7.1. The pessimistic scenario 
 
The regression output for the pessimistic scenario, i.e. when personnel expenditures are allowed to 
increase, is shown in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6: Estimation Results: Pessimistic Scenario 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Squared Population 0.852** 0.133 
Squared Area 0.001* 0.000 
Population Density 12244.301** 4476.850 
Intercept (α) 4893.430** 826.199 
Number of Observations 186 
R2 0.686 
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Here the explained variable is the total cost C of an LSG, while the explanatory variables are    = 
squared population,    = squared area, and    = population density. We estimate the values of the 
constant  and the coefficients   and         of the cost function 
 
     (        )                      (7.1) 
 
and the estimated values of these parameters are given in the column denoted “Coefficient” in Table 6. 
 
The constant α in equation 7.1, the fixed production cost of public services, corresponds to the intercept 
of the regression. Two asterisks at the estimation results denote that the estimation has a statistical 
significance of more than 99%, and one asterisk means that the statistical significance is higher than 
95%. This means that the probability that α is in fact 0 is below 1% (actually, as cannot be seen in the 
table, the statistical significance of α higher than 99.9%). Likewise, the two asterisks at the squared area 
means that the probability that the squared area has in fact no influence on the cost is less than 5% (in 
fact, it is just 2.4%, corresponding to a statistical significance of 97.6%). 
 
The statistical significance is above 95% for all coefficients of explanatory variables. In general, a 
significance level of 95% or higher is considered to be flawless, while even significance levels of 90% are 
sometimes accepted. 
 
In Table 6, the R2-value of 0.686 means that 68.6% of the variation of the cost can be explained by the 
variation of the explanatory variables. This is an exceptionally good value. An R2 higher than 0.5 is 
generally considered to be fine (cf. (9), p. 39-42). 
 
The choice of explanatory variables is the outcome of a long process of trials and errors. In the scatter 
plot shown in Figure 1, the vertical axis displays the total cost, while the horizontal axis denotes the 
population. Each dot in the graph corresponds to one municipality/year-combination. The red line 
illustrates the relationship between the number of people and the total cost, which can be 
approximated by a quadratic function.  
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Figure 1: A scatterplot of total cost and population 
 
Figure 2: A scatterplot of total cost and area 
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Similarly, in Figure 2 the vertical axis displays the total cost, but here the horizontal axis denotes the 
area of an LSG. Again, the plot suggests a non-linear relationship between both variables. 
 
The regression shown in Table 6 is adjusted for heteroscedasticity of the data. Heteroscedasticity means 
that the variance of a variable is correlated with the size of that variable. That there is a 
heteroscedasticity problem with the total cost can intuitively be seen in Figure 3: the dispersion of total 
cost is increasing with the population density of LSGs.  
 
Figure 3: A scatterplot of total cost and population density 
 
 
Heteroscedasticity can bias the estimated variances of the variables, which is detrimental for the 
significance level of a regression (though it does not bias the estimated values).  Also a formal indicator, 
the Breusch-Pagan test, suggests that the data are heteroscedastic (for background information on this 
test, see (9), p. 276). The hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity is rejected with a probability of 
almost 1. Heteroscedasticity can be corrected by computing the robust variances according to Huber 
and White (cf. (9), pp. 350-352), and this was done in all our regressions. 
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Another common concern about regressions is the so-called multicollinearity problem. If two or more of 
the explanatory variables are highly correlated with one another, the estimation will be biased. As it 
turns out, however, the correlations between the explanatory variables are unproblematic. As a rule of 
thumb, one does not need to be worried about multicollinearity if all correlation coefficients are from 
the interval [-0.9,0.9], and in our case the maximal correlation is 0.55 (between squared population and 
population density).11 
 
7.2. The optimistic scenario 
 
The same regression as before (i.e. with the same explanatory variables), but with personnel 
expenditures deduced from the total costs, is given in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Estimation Results: Optimistic Scenario 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Squared Population 0.735** 0.131 
Squared Area 0.001* 0.000 
Population Density 10914.888** 4430.234 
Intercept (α) 3043.166** 816.355 
Number of Observations 186 
R2 0.637 
 
As can be seen, the value for α has moved from 4,893,430 lari to 3,043,166 lari. All coefficients are 
significant on very high levels. As before, the value for R2 is reasonable and the heteroscedasticity 
problem is taken care of by a Huber and White correction of the variances. For illustrative purposes, in 
the next section we do the same regressions again without removing Batumi from the database. 
 
7.3. The regressions with Batumi 
 
The next two regressions, shown in Tables 8 and 9, estimate the cost function (7.1) without ignoring 
Batumi. We display these regression outputs here to illustrate the effect of removing Batumi from the 
data.  
                                                          
11 We also computed the so called variance inflation factor (VIF), a test for the severeness of multicollinearity. For 
all variables the VIF is far below 5, which is a generally accepted threshold. For background information on the VIF, 
see (9), p. 90. 
Biermann et al./LSG Reform  21 
 
 
Table 8: Estimation Results: Pessimistic scenario without removing Batumi 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Squared Population 0.631** 0.189 
Squared Area 0.001 0.001 
Population Density 23700.161** 1849.528 
Intercept (α) 5320.095** 1519.325 
Number of Observations 189 
R2 0.634 
 
The values for α in both scenarios are higher than in the corresponding regressions without Batumi, 
while the coefficients for the squared population and the squared area are lower. This implies 
unambiguously that the increase in the running costs caused by the reform would be estimated 
considerably higher if Batumi remains in the data. 
 
Table 9: Estimation Results: Optimistic scenario without removing Batumi 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Squared Population 0.549** 0.170 
Squared Area 0.001 0.001 
Population Density 20776.295** 1661.671 
Intercept (α) 3416.053** 1365.007 
Number of Observations 189 
R2 0.621 
 
8. Interpretation of the Results 
 
Given the available information, the estimated values are the most likely values for the parameters, but 
they are not certain. Due to the limited information and because there are always errors in the available 
data, in our approach all unknown numbers of interest are random variables. If all factors affecting the 
costs of each LSG were known and fully reliable data were available on each of them, one could 
compute the true values without any uncertainty. However, as this is not the case, any estimation must 
be stochastic in nature, and therefore it is possible (and likely!) that the true values of the estimated 
variables deviate positively or negatively from their estimates. The estimates in this report are the most 
likely values given the available information, not more and not less. 
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8.1. The fixed production costs 
 
Under the pessimistic scenario (the regression shown in Table 6), when the expenditures for personnel 
is assumed to behave in the same way as all other cost components, an average LSG has fixed 
production costs of 4,893,430 lari. In other words, according to our estimate, just the existence of an 
average LSG, even if  “it is not doing anything”, yields annual costs of about 4.9 million lari. 
 
It is important to stress that these are the expenditures that cannot be attributed to any of those 
explanatory variables listed in Table 2 and not only to those that were actually used in our regression. 
We systematically tried out different configurations of the potential explanatory variables listed in Table 
2. We came up with the combinations of explanatory variables of the regressions in Tables 6 and 7 
because they have the highest explanatory power for the variation of the total cost – under the 
restriction that the regression is statistically sound (R2, multicollinearity etc.). So, if, as a result of the 
reform, the average value of any of the variables in Table 2 changes, this would not change our 
estimation of the fixed production cost. 
 
In the optimistic scenario (the regression in Table 7) where personnel costs are kept constant, the fixed 
production costs are estimated to be 3,043,166 lari. These are the estimated annual running costs that 
in the optimistic scenario have to be paid for sustaining an average LSG. So, if there will be 20 new LSGs 
then, according to our estimation, there will be 20 times 3,043,166 lari of additional fixed costs under 
the optimistic scenario; if there will be 100 new LSGs, there will be 100 times 3,043,166 lari of additional 
fixed costs under the optimistic scenario, and so on. 
 
8.2. Changes in the variable production costs 
 
If there were no non-linearities in the regression (no squared population and no squared area), we 
would only have to consider the fixed production costs, because the overall variable costs would not be 
affected by how big the LSGs are. The total number of inhabitants, the total amount of land etc. would 
be the same both before and after the reform. Because the costs of running each LSG would be strictly 
proportional to the number of people and the amount of land it has, the total variable cost of all LSGs 
would remain the same, regardless of how Georgia is divided into LSGs. 
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Yet, as it turns out, the cost function is not linear in all its arguments, and so we have to take into 
account how increasing the number of LSGs also affects the variable production costs. As we cannot 
cover all the possibilities about how new LSGs will be formed as a result of the law, we have to restrict 
ourselves to scenario analyses. 
 
We look at two benchmark scenarios of how the existing municipalities could be split up. In the first 
scenario, each given LSG splits up into two new municipalities. In the second scenario, each current LSG 
splits up into four new municipalities. Under these assumptions, we compute what we call the 
population effect and the area effect, namely the impact on the (variable part of the) total production 
costs that results from splitting up the population and the land, respectively. 
 
Let us illustrate by an example how we compute the population effect for a municipality that has 50,000 
citizens under the pessimistic scenario. Measured in thousands, 50,000 inhabitants are just 50. The 
squared population is then 2,500. According to the regression in Table 6, the coefficient of the squared 
population is 0.85. So, for this LSG, the part of the total expenditures “caused” by the population is  
                         
lari,  where the factor of 1000 on the left hand side comes from the fact that the costs are measured in 
thousands of lari. 
 
Assume that this LSG would be split up into four new LSGs. For each of the new municipalities the 
“population costs” would be  
                      
lari. Taken together, the new LSGs would therefore have a cost of 530,400 lari. So the population effect 
of splitting up the LSG results in a cost reduction of 2,215,000 lari - 530,400 lari = 1,594,600 lari. 
 
We have done this exercise for all 62 currently existing LSGs that were included in our analysis and 
computed an average population effect of 2,594,182 lari if each of them splits up into 4 new 
municipalities. Analogously, we can compute the average area effect, which is 642,787 lari. The results 
for all scenarios are stated in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Average annual running cost change per LSG under different scenarios 
Scenario Fixed production cost Population Effect Area Effect Total Effect 
Pessimistic split by 2 4,893,430 - 1,729,454 - 428,525 2,735,451 
Pessimistic split by 4 14,680,290 - 2,594,182 - 642,787 11,443,321 
Optimistic split by 2 3,043,166 - 1,505,643 - 446,152 1,091,371 
Optimistic split by 4 9,129,498 - 2,258,464 - 669,228 6,201,806 
 
8.3. The total cost change 
 
Based on these data, we can compute the change in total running costs of all LSGs under all four 
scenarios. The result is given in Table 11. Depending on how many LSGs there will be, with 248 
municipalities being the maximum scenario and 124 being the minimum scenario, the additional total 
running cost of all LSGs is estimated to be between 67,665,002 lari and 709,485,902 lari. 
 
Table 11: Estimated changes of total annual running costs 
Scenario Total effect per LSG Total cost change 
Pessimistic split by 2 2,735,451 169,597,962 
Pessimistic split by 4 11,443,321 709,485,902 
Optimistic split by 2 1,091,371 67,665,002 
Optimistic split by 4 6,201,806 384,511,972 
 
Returning to our discussion on the assumptions of the estimations, in Section 3 above, it is important to 
keep in mind that all these numbers assume that the level and the quality of public services will be on 
the same level as they are currently. Future running costs would, of course, be influenced by improving 
or worsening the level and quality of services. 
 
For evaluating the proposed reform, it is decisive which likelihoods one assigns to the different scenarios 
(of course, it is also possible that the outcome of the reform will be somewhere between two of the four 
scenarios considered here). Arguably, whether or not one expects this reform to be beneficial for 
Georgia depends on these likelihoods. 
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